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It certainly seems like the originalists are winning. Professor 
Jack Balkin-finding that he couldn't beat 'em-joined them. 1 
Living constitutionalists used to turn to Balkin as a reliable ad-
vocate; he recently wrote "we are all living constitutionalists 
now."2 But Balkin has forsaken them. Losing such an important 
advocate might be a sign that what some once deemed the "as-
cendant" and dominant theory in constitutional interpretation is 
on the decline.3 Still, don't count living constitutionalism out of 
the game just yet-and don't think one can embrace Balkin's 
approach and a true living constitutionalism at the same time. 
We have before us in Balkin's new constitutional theory a 
lefty originalism to join another prominent conception of the 
same propounded by Balkin's colleague, Akhil Amar.4 Lefty 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law. Thanks to Myron Schonfeld, Jack Balkin. Bruce Ackerman, Dan Markel, Tali 
Farhadian, Chris Green, Patrick O'Donnell. Paul Horwitz. and Rick Garnett for en-
gagement on the themes developed here. 
1. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007). 
2. Jack M. Balkin, Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution. SLATE. 
Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.slate.com/id/2125226. 
3. See Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil. 57 U. C!N. L. REV. 849, 853 
(1989) ("Those who have not delved into the scholarly writing on constitutional law for 
several years may be unaware of the explicitness with which many prominent and re-
spected commentators reject the original meaning of the Constitution as an authoritative 
guide."): Jonathan R. Macey. Originalism as an 'Ism'. 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 
301 (1996) ("[A]mong constitutional law scholars at elite schools. the idea of being an 
originalist is tantamount to being some sort of intellectual Luddite."). But see Sanford 
Levinson. The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal 
Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495. 495 (1996) ("[A]lmost everyone is an originalist 
in at least some limited sense."): Michael J. Perry. The Legitimacy of Particular Concep-
tions of Constitutional Interpretation. 77 VA. L. REV. 669. 687 (1991) ("It seems difficult, 
in American political-legal culture. to make a persuasive case for nonoriginalism .... 
That difficulty helps to explain why it is so hard to locate a real. live nonoriginalist, 
whether judge or, even, academic theorist."). 
4. See Akhil Reed Amar. Rethinking Original ism: Original Intent for Liberals (and 
for Conservatives and Moderates, Too). SLATE. Sept. 21. 2005. http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2126680. Some charge another colleague. Bruce Ackerman. with the title too. See Suz-
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originalism, however, is not some new Yale invention.5 Hugo 
Black and John Hart Ely might be part of its old guard. Still, 
Balkin's coming-out as a lefty originalist now self-consciously 
aims to bury living constitutionalism as an independent theory 
and disarm its power. Balkin tells us that the choice between 
"originalism" and "living constitutionalism" is overdrawn and 
"rests upon a false dichotomy." He argues that we must maintain 
fidelity to the original meaning of the document- but that fidel-
ity is achieved by committing to the original meaning of "text 
and principle" rather than to the "original expected application" 
of those texts and principles. The former is "binding law" and 
the latter is not. Once we embrace this distinction, Balkin con-
tends, we can retain the flexibility and adaptability that under-
writes what he takes to be living constitutionalism's agenda and 
simultaneously pledge allegiance to an original meaning original-
ism. His final result is an impressively original and respectably 
originalist defense of abortion rights under the United States 
Constitution. 
But why are the Constitution and its original principles 
binding, again? And is living constitutionalism really dead after 
Balkin's coup de grace (or is it a coup d'etat)? An anxious ap-
proach to the first question should lead to a negative answer to 
the second. In short, living constitutionalism's core animating 
anxiety is that the Constitution (and most especially its original 
meaning) may not be binding-and that anxiety leads to inter-
pretive mechanics that are fundamentally in tension with the in-
terpretive mechanics that originalists prefer. 6 On this important 
measure, Balkin is now an originalist through and through; and 
living constitutionalism remains alive as a real alternative. Living 
constitutionalism is more than a pedestrian desire for flexibility 
and adaptability, an excuse for nominally liberal results, and an 
anna Sherry. The Ghost of Liberalism Past. 105 HARV. L. REV. 918. 933 (1992) ("Acker-
man's theory is merely originalism flying under liberal colors."). But see Bruce Acker-
man. The Living Constitution. 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007) (arguing for a form of liv-
ing constitutionalism). 
5. Although I can't spell out the differences in this context. what I'm calling 
"lefty" originalism is rather different from what Timothy Sandefur has recently called 
"liberal originalism ... See Timothy Sandefur. Liberal Original ism: A Past for Our Future. 
27 HARV. J.L. & PCB. POL'Y 489 (2004). 
6. Throughout this essay. I am clearly generalizing about living constitutional-
ism-and making a claim about its psychology that is, admittedly. somewhat hard to ver-
ify. One could undoubtedly find people who purport to be living constitutionalists and 
desire only flexibility in interpretation. These people may, after all. be satisfied with 
Balkin's considerable achievements and may be willing to become Balkinized original-
ists. 
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attempt to have a "conversation between the generations" about 
vague and ambiguous clauses in the Constitution. 
I want to focus here on a relatively underdeveloped aspect 
of Balkin's paper: his quick dismissal of living constitutionalism 
and his underlying assumption that living constitutionalists will 
be able to embrace his approach without difficulty. To be sure, 
many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist 
in disguise-and may not let him into their club, notwithstanding 
his bona fides as an adept historian of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But my main thesis here is that Balkin should no longer be 
welcomed by the living constitutionalists, despite his claim to be 
meeting their fundamental needs.7 
Balkin's discussion engages originalists, first and foremost. 
Although he devotes substantial effort to rejecting an "original 
expected applications originalism," he still aims to demonstrate 
his street credibility as an originalist. Indeed, living constitution-
alists get little more than a passing mention in Balkin's paean to 
original meaning. We get no real flavor of what a coherent ac-
count of living constitutionalism might look like-nor how 
Balkin's approach might leave living constitutionalists satisfied 
that his unifying theory meets their concerns. It may be that the 
very metaphor of a living constitution is full of "teasing impreci-
sion," as former Chief Justice Rehnquist once wrote.8 But once I 
explicate a bit about living constitutionalism here (or one variant 
7. This club and those who try to explain it hardly even appear in Balkin's account 
that purports to dismiss it. Some relatively well-known sources would likely include 
HOWARD LEE MCBAIN. THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE 
REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FuNDAMENTAL LAW (1927): EDWARDS. CORWIN, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (Alpheus Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964); 
EDWARDS. CORWIN. TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934): Edward S. Corwin. 
Constitution v. Constitutional Theory. 19 AM. POL SCI. REV. 290 (1925): Charles A. 
Reich. Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution. 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963); 
Charles Beard. The Living Constillltion. 185 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 29 ( 1936 ): William J. Brennan. Jr.. The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification. 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986): HERMAN BELZ, A LIVING 
CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW~: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1998): Howard Gillman. The Collapse of Constitutional 
Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of 
American State-Building. 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 191 ( 1997): Adam Winkler. A Revolu-
tion Too Soon: Women Suffragists and the "Living Constitution." 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 
(2001). An exciting new statement can be found in Ackerman. supra note 4. 
My reconstruction of living constitutionalism here is very selective-and imposes a 
particular perspective on a broad-ranging group of jurists. many of whom could reasona-
bly contest my account. The purpose here is only to show how a central form of living 
constitutionalism remains an important alternative to Balkin's approach. 
8. William Rehnquist. The Notion of a Living Constitution. 54 TEX. L. REV. 693. 
693 (1976). For a recent philosophical discussion of the metaphor. see Aileen Kavanagh. 
The Idea of a Living Constitution. 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 55 (2003). 
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thereof), I should be able to establish how Balkin's "text and 
principle" methodology fails to accommodate fully the center of 
living constitutionalism. Original meaning originalism and living 
constitutionalism are hardly, as Balkin concludes, "opposite 
sides of the same coin." Indeed, they trade in different curren-
Cies. 
Under any reading of originalism, lefty or otherwise, history 
is its main currency.9 First-order constitutional interpretation is a 
project of uncovering some historical truth or reconstruction 
about the text and structure of the Constitution. In this regard, 
Balkin's originalism is no different from any other: the original 
public meaning at the time of ratification is at the core of the 
theory and it achieves a privileged position in Balkin's interpre-
tive project. Although this is not always perfectly clear in 
Balkin's discussion of his theory, I take him to be distinguishing 
between the "text and principles" that are to be derived only 
from their original historical meaning- which he deems immu-
table and binding-and the "application and implementation" 
thereof- which can change with the times. Tying the text and 
principles to the historical fact of the matter is his basic conces-
sion to originalism, whereas his flexibility in application and im-
plementation is his attempt to incorporate living constitutional-
ism. 
Different kinds of originalists, however, admit different 
modalities of constitutional interpretation into constitutional de-
cision-making in further iterations of the interpretive process. 10 
So Scalia's "faint-hearted" originalism, to take a widely-
9. For a fuller account, one would have to specify the scope of the history that can 
be admitted in pursuing the original meaning of a provision. For my purposes here, I as-
sume that most originalists prefer. in the first instance. an investigation into the original 
public meanings of constitutional provisions-as their ratifiers would have understood 
them. 
One could. however, take a broader view of the constitutional history that is rele-
vant in constitutional interpretation-and still maintain focus on history as such. This is, 
perhaps. the strategy of Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, who self-consciously look 
for a "third way" between originalism and living constitutionalism. See Barry Friedman 
& Scott B. Smith. The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
10. A useful set of the modalities of constitutional interpretation comes from 
PHILIP C. BOBBITI. CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 
(1982); PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-14 (1991). It includes 
text. history, structure. doctrine, ethical considerations, and prudential considerations. 
Bobbit argues that the set is "legitimate" insofar as the Supreme Court uses each modal-
ity in its decision-making processes. In short, my thesis here is that originalists and living 
constitutionalists differ on which modalities to admit into the interpretive process and 
when. And because of this difference, Balkin's approach cannot so easily dismiss the di-
chotomy between his lefty originalism and a faithful account of living constitutionalism. 
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discussed example, yields to precedent and prudential considera-
tions occasionally. 11 Randy Barnett's theory of "constitutional 
construction" helps fill the gaps left over after first-order 
originalism does its work and vagueness remains. 12 And Balkin's 
original meaning originalism, though self-consciously rather dif-
ferent from Scalia's originalism and Barnett's construction, also 
allows different modalities to fill out and apply the "text and 
principles" in a conceptually later stage of constitutional inter-
pretation. Balkin's rights to abortion have their roots in histori-
cal excavation- that is where the original meaning of the princi-
ples comes from. But the principles gain flesh and heft through a 
variety of constitutional modalities that help "translate" the 
principles (with fidelity, fit, and justification) for our time. 
Balkin's specification and translation of his "text and principles" 
may depart too far from original meaning for some originalists' 
taste but there is no doubt that Balkin's procedure involves a 
conceptually prior historical project in the first instance. 
To generalize only somewhat, originalists seem to agree that 
first-order debates about constitutional interpretation are ques-
tions for history. This has all kinds of benefits, which is why 
originalism is attractive to so many: It is parsimonious; it gives us 
ground to debate hard questions at some remove from our per-
sonal political and moral preferences; it may keep judges in 
check so they don't impose their preferences upon us; it may al-
low our confirmation battles to be less explosive (assuming eve-
ryone bought in);13 and it may be the best way (or only way!) to 
11. See, e.g.. Randy E. Barnett. Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted 
Originalism. 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006). 
12. See RANDY E. BARNETT. RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 118-30 (2004). 
Barnett draws from and employs terminology developed by KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(2001). 
13. I must say that I've always found this particular argument difficult to under-
stand. If there were an interpretive consensus around any theory of constitutional inter-
pretation. confirmation hearings might be simplified. But even supposing originalism be-
came the only credible interpretive approach. people would still occasionally deploy it 
differently, rely on different histories. and reach different results. Our two most commit-
ted originalists on the Supreme Court. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, 
deploy the theory differently-and some of the debates among originalists can be just as 
heated as the disputes between the originalists and the living constitutionalists. If one 
needs a recent example. watching Barnett try to boot Scalia from the originalist camp is 
especially fun. See Barnett. supra note 11. Perhaps Barnett will help purify the originalist 
camp in the long run; if he does. Balkin likely won't be admitted to it. Indeed, Balkin's 
account looks a bit like a modified and more history-friendly version of the "underlying 
principles" approach Barnett has recently dismissed. See id at 19-22. Yet, for some rea-
son I can't quite figure out. Barnett goes a bit soft on Balkin in his contribution to this 
Symposium. See Randy Barnett. Underlying Principles. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 
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get at the very meaning of the text itself. 14 This is why some 
originalists think originalism is simply the pragmatic choice: it is, 
perhaps, a lesser evil, there is no good and coherent competitor, 
and democratic legislatures and social movements will function 
better if we embrace its elegant minimalism. 
It bears repeating, I think, that although originalists are uni-
fied about first-order interpretation that draws upon the history 
and historical sources surrounding ratification, there are cer-
tainly intramural disagreements among the originalists about 
what sorts of considerations may legitimately be considered at 
the "back end," once a meaning or original principle is derived 
historically. Indeed, Balkin invites us to see constitutional inter-
pretation as a two-stage process (text and principles, then appli-
cation and implementation)-and all originalists give history 
pride of place at the first stage. From there, there are some di-
vergences about application: decision-makers occasionally 
smuggle doctrine, consequences, prudence, construction with a 
"liberty presumption," practice, and political morality through 
the back door to keep originalism palatable or to translate its 
historical commands for our time. Although some originalists 
deny that there can be any gap between the first order inquiry 
and ultimate constitutional decision-making, it cannot easily be 
denied that many originalists depart from their first-order in-
quiry after excavating some "original meaning." Because Balkin 
clearly prioritizes history in his first order inquiry into "text and 
principles," the originalists should welcome him to their team." 
Living constitutionalists, by contrast, trade in a different 
currency. They simply do not privilege history (of ratification) in 
constitutional interpretation. They don't necessarily sideline 
text, history, and structure; these are just parts of the motley 
constellation that is constitutional interpretation. Balkin is un-
doubtedly right that living constitutionalists are particularly con-
(2007). 
14. Whether and how well originalists accomplish these desiderata is an ongoing 
conversation that I will not try to summarize or capture here. 
15. I concede that most probably don't think about constitutional interpretation as 
a two-step process. Indeed, Barnett has called the "back end" stage "construction"- and 
would constrain when and how construction may supplement interpretation. One of the 
nice innovations of Balkin's rich paper is that he invites us to think in this fruitful way. 
For those unwilling to see interpretation through this lens. however. I could proba-
bly run a very similar argument by focusing upon the relative weight originalists give cer-
tain modalities as compared to the living constitutionalists. And it would still be the case 
that Balkin's privileging of history at the principle-derivation stage puts him closer to the 
originalists. In any case. I actually believe that looking at interpretation through the two-
step makes the differences I want to highlight clearer. so I stick with it in the text above. 
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cerned with the ''dead hand of the past" controlling the present 
generation. 16 But precisely because they are, they cannot be con-
tent with Balkin's methodology: original meaning originalism-
even Balkin's kind that allows contemporary translations on the 
"back end"-gives pride of place to the very dead hand living 
constitutionalists are convinced we must resist to maintain the 
document's present-day legitimacy.17 Originalists either bracket 
the problem of the document's legitimacy, evade the basic ques-
tion of the document's legitimacy, or are content that they have 
come up with some account that takes this question off the table. 
Living constitutionalists just can't get over it; the anxiety about 
legitimacy is always present and pervasive. 1 ~ And Balkin is no 
longer anxious or pessimistic about the legitimacy of the docu-
ment.19 Indeed, he is cheerful and optimistic. 
Living constitutionalists are plagued by anxiety about the 
dead hand of the past-and think we need to update and affirm 
the document's underlying principles if it is to be binding on 
anyone living today. The fixation on the dead hand of the past is 
not a mere motto but a mood with real interpretive conse-
quences. To be sure, no one loses sight of the fact that it is a 
written document-a fact which itself has some interpretive 
16. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789). in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392. 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gains. Jr. eds .. 
1958) ("'the earth belongs in usufruct to the living:" "The question whether one genera-
tion of men has a right to bind another. seems never to have been started either on this 
or our side of the water."): Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12. 
1816). in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 552. 560 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) 
("Each generation is as independent as the one preceding. as that was of all which had 
gone before. It has then, like them. a right to choose for itself the form of government it 
believe most promotive of its own happiness .... "). 
17. For an example of a living constitutionalist resisting the dead hand. see Acker-
man. supra note 4. In particular. Ackerman questions whether the structure of the basic 
document makes any sense in our time. The Constitution. he argues. envisions citizens 
being citizens of states first and the nation only second. Today's citizens. by contrast. are 
Americans first and Vermonters only second. !d. at 1749-50. Although he doesn't quite 
speak in the language of anxiety I employ here, he does not assume away constitutional 
legitimacy in his interpretive methodology-and precisely because he doesn't, his inter-
pretive mechanics do not privilege original meaning. !d. at 1776--77. For Ackerman. spe-
cial statutes may be admitted in the first stage of interpretation to derive and understand 
the very principles themselves. !d. at 1802. 
18. It is possible, of course. that different parts of the Constitution elicit different 
levels of the anxiety. The Preamble's substantial generalities may. perhaps. rest on a dif-
ferent footing than the specificities of the amendment provisions. 
19. For a new statement of pessimism about the document. see SANFORD 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES 
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). Although he claims that 
nothing in the book is to be taken as relevant to a theory of constitutional interpretation. 
id. at 23. it is hard to imagine that such pessimism and anxiety is irrelevant to the practice 
of interpretation. Indeed. I think it underwrites living constitutionalism itself. 
360 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:353 
ramifications. 20 But living constitutionalists insist that the legiti-
macy of the document cannot be fully defended if our first-order 
approach to it draws exclusively upon the historical. This re-
quires that at the first-order level of constitutional interpretation 
and first-order derivation of the document's underlying princi-
ples themselves much more than history must be in play. The en-
tire matrix of the various modalities of constitutional interpreta-
tion is fair game to enable an authentic dynamicism that can 
contribute to contemporary legitimacy. One cannot mollify the 
living constitutionalist merely by telling her, as Balkin does, that 
the document can achieve some flexibility and adaptability 
through some broadly-phrased clauses here and there. 
To state it slightly differently, it is only our Constitution be-
cause it is suffused with and supported by contemporary assent. 
But living constitutionalists do not pledge faith (as Balkin's "text 
and principles" approach requires) before interpretation gets off 
the ground. Living constitutionalists demand that the living's 
views and expectations be reflected in the principles of the 
document itself; their needs cannot be deferred for the later 
"application and implementation" stage of constitutional inter-
pretation. Without an effort to tether the contemporary genera-
tion's consent to the document and its principles, it might ulti-
mately be legitimate to abandon it altogether. That threat is very 
real for the living constitutionalist, who can revere and venerate 
the document only when it is unmoored from its original mean-
ing-or, perhaps, only when the Preamble is taken to announce 
the underlying principles for the whole document at a very high 
level of generality. 
Although some living constitutionalists might prefer more 
regular constitutional conventions to help the process of legiti-
mation, most living constitutionalists don't want to abandon the 
document altogether. They can generally concede with Balkin 
that the living have undeniable connections with the dead-that 
we share a collective memory and fate with them. Yet, a living 
constitutionalist insists that the document is only ours when our 
consent to it today is something other than completely fictive. 
Therefore, any first-order constitutional interpretation that pre-
20. Originalists routinely point to the document's ··writtenness" and amendment 
provisions to argue against an evolving Constitution. See, e.g., Diarmuid O'Scannlain, 
Today's Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the Federal Judiciary. 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PuB. POL'Y 169. 179 (2003). Writtenness and the possibility of repeal and modification, 
however. doesn't necessarily preclude dynamic interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (1987). 
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vents the full range of interpretive modalities from destabilizing 
original meaning risks betraying the entire "social contract." 
This is a key to living constitutionalism and, in turn, the key that 
locks Balkin out of the club. 
In summary, a core difference between the originalists and 
the living constitutionalists turns on what we might call interpre-
tative mechanics-and Balkin aligns himself with the originalist 
form. Originalists exclude many "extrinsic" constitutional mo-
dalities in their first pass at any particular constitutional ques-
tion; living constitutionalists let it all in from the start. Discus-
sions of consequences, underlying principles of political 
morality, prudence, doctrine, rule of law considerations: all these 
are relevant (even if not, perhaps, equally relevant) for living 
constitutionalists at the first moment that a question of constitu-
tional interpretation presents itself. Originalists either rule these 
considerations out of the interpretive game entirely or admit 
them only in later conceptual stages of the interpretive enter-
prise. 
Many people would have no trouble with originalist me-
chanics because they take for granted that the document is bind-
ing. Without anxiety about the basic legitimacy of the document 
and the original principles it embodies, originalists can keep a lot 
of questions and considerations at bay in the first stage of inter-
pretation. Perhaps if we agree that the document has inherent 
bindingness, one can reasonably argue that the document's 
meaning is revealed in the first instance as a question of history. 
Living constitutionalists can and do offer theories of mean-
ing to contest this last supposition; they argue that meaning itself 
requires dynamic interpretation. But that debate is not my core 
concern here because much more is at stake in constitutional in-
terpretation than a debate about linguistic meaning; constitu-
tional interpretation is a social practice of legitimation for the 
living constitutionalist. Nor is my central interest here the em-
pirical question about which interpretive mechanics better de-
scribe actual constitutional argumentation and constitutional 
politics in state and society.21 
21. Indeed. originalism (even of Balkin's form) may seem like an undesirable the-
ory because it just doesn't seem like a good positive account of what people (whether 
seen as "the people," judges, social movements, or law professors) are contesting in con-
stitutional politics and constitutional discourse. They aren't necessarily having a debate 
about history in the first instance-even if they acknowledge that history is an important 
factor or modality in the interpretive project too. It is hard to see much of the debate 
about abortion in particular as an effort to uncover historical principles and apply them 
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Rather, my central concern is what I think motivates and 
animates living constitutionalism's interpretative mechanics. 
Conceding the fundamental bindingness of the document when 
confronted with every question of constitutional interpretation 
(as many originalists, including Balkin must do) impliedly rejects 
the living constitutionalist's preference that constitutional inter-
pretation and adjudication should, every time constitutional dia-
logue gets off the ground, re-ask in the first instance the question 
of the very legitimacy of the document as our social contract to-
day. 
To be sure, the instability implied by constitutional politics 
and constitutional interpretation with such high stakes is daunt-
ing. It can even seem subversive, unsettling what we think of as 
an especially important part of constitutional government: re-
straining majoritarianism and protecting certain rights from eve-
ryday political contest.22 The consequent messiness, seeming lack 
of discipline, purported lack of fidelity (and actual lack of faith 
from time to time), disrespect for the document, and too sub-
stantial delegation to the judiciary likely go a long way in ex-
plaining why living constitutionalism is unattractive to so many. 
It is part of why Balkin feels the need to distance himself from 
this seemingly antinomian orientation. But it will satisfy only a 
few living constitutionalists to be handed some vague clauses 
that can be updated easily.23 This just isn't enough to make the 
in our time: at its core it is a debate about very fundamental questions of political and 
personal morality. Those engaging in these debates may be surprised to learn that they 
have to read the Congressional Record to justify their positions. 
Living constitutionalism, by contrast. can perhaps make better sense of the positive 
reality of constitutional discourse: this is especially so when we focus on constitutional 
interpretation by citizens. whom Balkin puts at the core of his theory of constitutional 
interpretation. Citizens are probably much worse than judges at limiting their discourse 
to history in deriving ·•text and principles:· which Balkin's originalism requires. 
22. I tend to think this critique against living constitutionalism. although commonly 
heard. misunderstands and oversimplifies the political project of constitutionalism. But 
this is hardly the place for such an argument. 
23. Gillman's account of living constitutionalism in Gillman. supra note 7. some-
times reads as if Balkin's distinction between "original expected application" and "origi-
nal meaning" might do the trick. See id. at 221 (highlighting the separation of "princi-
ples" from "the particular means" the framers used to realize them). id. at 222-23 
(invoking Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). id. 
at 231 (invoking a statement of living constitutionalism by FDR). But there is much in 
Gillman's summary of living constitutionalism's advocates that is not as easy to reconcile 
with Balkin. See id. at 222-25 (drawing upon Brandeis's idea that interpretation might 
"ignore[] the expressed will of the sovereign in favor of an imagined set of aspirational 
goals" that are barely expressed in the document itself and explaining the result in Home 
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaidsdell. 290 U.S. 398 (1934) as justifiable only if the very 
basic principles expressed in the document are subject to radical reinterpretation). id. at 
235-36 (discussing Corwin's explicit rejection of "fidelity to tradition" and his belief that 
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living constitutionalists happy and get them to stop pestering us 
with their questions that go to the very core of our practice of 
constitutionalism. 
Living constitutionalism takes the threat of basic illegiti-
macy very seriously. Although the document needn't be consid-
ered profane,24 neither can it be treated as sacred.25 Our civic life 
together is not a religious covenantal community that requires 
adherence to our governing document just because it happens to 
exist and happens to help constitute us as a people. The docu-
ment and our life under it always stands in need of moral, practi-
cal, and political justification -and living constitutionalism al-
ways requires us to ask for that justification at the very moment 
when we ask for the meaning of the document and its provisions. 
This is why living constitutionalists cannot give history pride of 
place and require a much more eclectic approach to first-order 
inquiries in its interpretive mechanics. Balkin assumes a faith 
that living constitutionalists think needs to be earned through 
the interpretive process itselr_l6 
the meaning of the Constitution itself must change with time). id. at 236 (highlighting 
Corwin's insistence that the document must gain authority only from the living). 
This tension within Gillman's account obviously highlights that living constitutional-
ism is a big umbrella-and surely some will be able to live with Balkin's original meaning 
originalism. But I would guess that most of them. if they were honest. would not for the 
reasons I specify here: his interpretative mechanics and mood are originalist. 
It may be that living constitutionalists would find it dangerous and embarrassing to 
admit their psychological condition. But I think my analysis here should nevertheless 
help explain why they will have trouble embracing Balkin ·s account. 
24. The classic invocation here is William Lloyd Garrison's view of the Constitution 
as ''A Covenant with Death and an Agreement with Hell." See William Lloyd Garrison. 
THE LIBERATOR. May 6, 1842, at 3. 
25. See MCBAIN. supra note 7. at 272 (arguing that the Constitution "was not 
handed down on Mount Sinai bv the Lord God of Hosts. It is not revealed law. It is no 
final cause"). I concede that so~e living constitutionalists cannot help themselves and 
resort to calling the Constitution sacred text. See, e.g .. Ackerman. supra note 4. at 1752-
53 . Although I don't see this metaphor as appropriate for an honest living constitutional-
ism. a weak form of textualism is potentially consistent with living constitutionalism. For 
more on how that might work. see infra. 
26. The deepest work analyzing faith in the Constitution is SANFORD LEVINSON. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). There. one can surely see on display the sort of agnosti-
cism. ambivalence. and demand for legitimacy I am attributing to living constitutional-
ism. Although Levinson once pledged a tortured faith in that early work. he no longer 
would be willing to sign the document himself. See LEVINSON. supra note 19. at 5. Back 
when Balkin was a living constitutionalist. one could see him embracing Levinsonian 
anxiety about constitutional faith: 
Law offers us the promise of justice without ever making good on that promise 
in full. That is why the most basic problem of jurisprudence is the problem of 
faith in law: and the most basic question in jurisprudence is the question to what 
extent our faith in law is justified. At the heart of law. and the philosophy of 
law. lies the problem of faith and idolatry. 
Jack M. Balkin. Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sandy Levinson. 38 TULSA L. 
364 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:353 
Admittedly, it is somewhat unfashionable these days to be-
lieve that political obligation, our obligation to obey the law of 
the Constitution, stems from any social contract theory of the 
traditional liberal form. Still, underlying many versions of both 
originalism and living constitutionalism remains some view that 
the Constitution's legitimacy as binding law derives, in part, 
from its role as our organizing social contract. 27 To say, as some 
do,2~ that it binds only our government and our officials-who 
themselves swear an oath to it to renew its bindingness29 -evades 
the most basic reality that the Constitution plays a central role in 
all of our political lives. Accordingly, when looking for the assent 
or consent of the governed to legitimate the document, it is not 
terribly uncommon to think of the Constitution in contract law 
terms (even though the analogy falls apart in many different 
ways).30 Randy Barnett has done the most to use contract theory 
to help underwrite originalism and its quest to quiet the anxious 
question of the "dead hand" distressing the living constitutional-
ists.31 But I think some contract ideas may also be marshaled on 
REV. 553. 577 (2003). For his original meaning originalism. Balkin has had to leave his 
worries about constitutional idolatry behind-with the living constitutionalists. 
27. BARNETI. supra note 12. is a notable-and very interesting-exception. I very 
much doubt he squares the circle of legitimacy with his alternative to popular sover-
eignty. But his originalism displays the very confidence in legitimacy I have ascribed to 
that group of constitutional theorists. In some ways. originalism is driven by the fear of 
the consequences of taking the possibility of illegitimacy seriously: it represses the prob-
lem to cope with the fear. See id. at 5 (warning that rejecting originalism may lead to dis-
order because we might have to conclude that "no one [is] behind the curtain and 
[judges'] commands are utterly devoid of binding authority"). 
28. E.g., id. at 12. 
29. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written. "[o]ur constitutional order does not 
depend on hypothetical contracts. There are actual contracts. Like other judges. I took 
an oath to support and enforce both the laws and the Constitution. That is to say. I made 
a promise-a contract." Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1119.1122 (1998). 
30. Among the most important ways (that may dissuade us from pursuing this thin 
analogy at all) is that contracts require actual assent among parties. something that we 
can never hope for in constitutional politics. There are many other forceful objections to 
pursuing this analogy as well. See, e.g.. RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM. 
COI\STITUTIONALISM. DEMOCRACY 82-142 (2003): Trevor W. Morrison. Lamenting 
Lochner's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case for a Libertarian Constitution. 90 CORNELL L. 
REv. 839 (2005). 
31. See, e.g .. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 
611 (1999). Contract theory has also been marshaled to defend a particular set of propo-
sitions about constitutional interpretation in David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: 
Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist, and the Supreme Court. 85 MINN. L. REV. 755. 756 
(2000); and Easterbrook. supra note 29. 
As it turns out. Barnett views "popular sovereignty" as an implausible account of the 
Constitution's legitimacy. See generally BARNETI. supra note 12. at 11-52. And his help-
ful discussion suggests that even contract principles may be unwelcome because of the 
difficulty of finding anything resembling "consent" to the contract. This doesn't. as it 
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the side of the interpretive theory preferred by living constitu-
tionalism. 
If we were to indulge the analogy for a moment, perhaps 
what is most notable about our constitutional contract is that it is 
very difficult to modify-and that there is virtually no negotiat-
ing over the written terms by the living. It is a form contract, a 
classic "contract of adhesion. "32 The terms are offered on a 
"take-it-or-leave-it basis" and the "only alternative to complete 
adherence is outright rejection."33 
Yet it is still more disturbing than a mere consumer contract 
of adhesion because unlike some objective manifestations of as-
sent that routinely precede formation in most form contracting, 
there is precious little most citizens do to manifest assent. Some 
of our officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution- and for 
these people it is, perhaps, much more similar to a classic con-
sumer contract. But for most citizens whose lives are affected by 
and organized by the Constitution, there are only very attenu-
ated manifestations of assent, some of which are produced, per-
haps, under coercion. Citizens may pay taxes to the constitution-
ally sanctioned government and may follow many of the laws 
promulgated by those given authority through the Constitution's 
provisions. But these activities may just as easily be the product 
of coercion-the threat of being jailed-rather than affirmative 
assent to the social contract. Voting is more voluntaristic, of 
course, but we needn't manifest any allegiance to the process: 
We partake because the results of elections will control us any-
way. In short, consent to our central contract of adhesion is ex-
tremely attenuated. 
A living constitutionalist might look to some theorists of 
form contracts to see if there are any special interpretive rules 
that might govern such instruments. Randy Barnett's theory of 
form contracting34 -a relatively adhesion-friendly theory, to 
turns out, prevent Barnett from resorting to contract theory to underwrite originalism. 
32. Some further discussion of this idea (in a different context) can be found in 
Alex Kozinski & Harry Susman, Original Mean[derjings, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1598-
1600 (1997). They address whether the ratifiers themselves could be bound by the adhe-
sive nature of the Constitution. One critical problem they identify-which applies to my 
use of the analogy too-is that the idea is somewhat anachronistic. As they note. "[t]he 
term 'contract of adhesion' did not appear in the United States until 1919." !d. at 1599 
n.l08. But living constitutionalists are freed from the difficulties of anachronism, per-
haps, because they don't see themselves as bound by the original intent of original intent. 
33. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH. CONTRACfS 312 (2d ed. 1990). 
34. See Randy E. Barnett. Consenting to Form Contracts. 71 FORD. L. REV. 627 
(2002). 
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boot- highlights a few special limitations of adhesion contracts. 
First, an actual manifestation of assent is important to trigger en-
forceability. We seem to lack that manifestation with respect to 
most citizens and, accordingly, the enforceability of the contract 
becomes a source of debate and anxiety in the very first instance. 
Even if we could bracket that hurdle (and to get the inter-
pretive project off the ground, the living constitutionalist may 
need to concede that some general assent to some basic text may 
be implied), Barnett insists that we can never commit through a 
form contract "to violate the rights of others or ... transfer or 
waive an inalienable right."35 Accordingly, there may be a 
"higher law" that doesn't itself derive from the Constitution. 
This "higher law" can constrain the terms in a contract of adhe-
sion. More, the "higher law" supplied by political morality more 
generally might be imagined to vary with the times. That is so 
because formation under the adhesive contract happens anew 
for each citizen, triggering a new baseline set of inalienable 
rights conferred by our renewed sense of justice in each genera-
tion. 
Together, these contract ideas can help living constitutional-
ists explain both why they are terribly anxious about legitimacy 
in the first instance and why they think fundamental principles of 
political morality and ethics are always in play when taking to 
the task of interpreting our constitutional contract of adhesion. 
There are ways out of the "higher law" of the dead if a "higher 
law" of the living trumps it. 36 
There is more to the analogy, too. It is routine in form con-
tracting to construe any ambiguities that arise in interpretation 
and construction against the drafter. To be sure, clear, conspicu-
ous, and especially visible terms in a contract of adhesion are of-
ten enforceable.37 But as soon as any ambiguity arises, the con-
35. /d. at 637. 
36. Much of Bruce Ackerman's career can be seen as an effort to specify conditions 
for "higher lawmaking" outside of the document's formal amendment procedures. see, 
e.g .. BRUCE ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991), which them-
selves are arguably unconscionable given the reality of what it takes to modify the docu-
ment formally. The "usage of trade" on practices of constitutional amendment in the 
world communitv reveals the American constitution to be the single most difficult Con-
stitution in exist~nce to amend. See Donald Lutz. Toward a Formal Theory of Constitu-
tional Amendment. in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 261 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995): LEVINSON, supra 
note 19. at 204 n.29 (discussing Lutz and the Yugoslav Constitution, which was harder to 
amend when it existed). This unconscionability may be yet another reason living consti-
tutionalists are much more open to non-Article V amendment. 
37. See generally Todd Rakoff. Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction. 
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sumer under the adhesive contract will likely be able to have the 
contract construed to her benefit and against the drafter. As one 
court put it, "if some substantive provision of [an] agreement is 
fairly susceptible of a certain construction and the contractor ac-
tually and reasonably so construes it, in the course of ... per-
formance, that is the interpretation which will be adopted."'x 
Finally-and most pertinent to the potential for living con-
stitutionalists to draw from the concept of the contract of adhe-
sion to explicate their interpretive principles-contracts of adhe-
sion can be limited to consumers' "reasonable expectations."39 
Terms are not to be interpreted to "exceed some bound of rea-
sonableness."40 To be sure, usually when courts construe adhe-
sion contracts in light of "reasonable expectations," the relevant 
expectations are measured as of the time of formation. 41 But 
"formation" in the case of the Constitution is happening over 
and over again with each new living citizen that is drawn into the 
contract. So we must transpose the doctrine to help us interpret 
the document upon implementation and enforcement as well. As 
the Supreme Court wrote in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,42 
"clauses contained in form ... contracts [of adhesion] are subject 
to ... scrutiny for fundamental fairness." Thus, interpreters are 
given a somewhat free hand to legitimize form contracts by po-
licing for fundamental fairness. Barnett's motto seems particu-
larly apt: "We must never forget that it is a form contract [we 
are] expounding. "43 
To be fair, not all courts and commentators embrace the 
principles of interpretation for contracts of adhesion that I dis-
cuss here.44 Still, seeing the Constitution for the kind of social 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). Perhaps here is where the living constitutionalist can cede 
something to a pure textualism: The President must be 35 years old because it is crystal 
clear (and doesn't, perhaps. offend inalienable rights)-and only limited general assent 
seems to be required for such a clear provision. For more on the distinction between 
general assent and specific assent in form contracts. see KARL LLEWELLYN. THE 
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960). 
38. WPC Enter.. Inc. v. United States. 323 F.2d 874.876 (1963). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211. cmts. e-f (1981 ). 
40. Barnett. supra note 34. at 638. 
41. See, e.g.. Andrew Kull. Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Con-
tract Remedies. 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1. 38-39 (1991). 
42. 499U.S.585.595(1991). 
43. Barnett. supra note 34. at 639. 
44. Judge Easterbrook seems willing. for example. to enforce any provision of a 
contract of adhesion as long as it isn't unconscionable. See ProCD. Inc. v. Zeidenberg. 86 
F.3d 1447 (1996): Hill v. Gateway 2000. Inc .. 105 F.3d 1147 (1997). Moreover. Barnett 
actually embraces these Easterbrook decisions and aims to limit the broad reasonable 
expectations doctrine of cases like C & 1 Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co .. 
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contract that it is recommends particular interpretive principles. 
If the Constitution is a contract of adhesion, we should, in our 
very first pass at interpretation and construction: (1) investigate 
the type of assent we can justifiably ascribe to citizens; (2) en-
force bits of text that are plain, uncontroversial, and particularly 
clear; (3) construe ambiguous phrases against the "drafter" and 
in favor of those who are assenting today;45 (4) protect the kinds 
of inalienable rights that the contractual document must be read 
to respect (rights that can change over time as the contract re-
forms anew); (5) protect the reasonable expectations of today's 
signatories; and ( 6) assess whether the document and its poten-
tial applications accord with fundamental fairness. This is a living 
constitutionalism, indeed, that does not privilege history (though 
history may be relevant in assessing reasonable expectations) 
and takes seriously the task of legitimating the document for to-
day's generation.46 
Some final points, in conclusion. My aim here has not been 
to convert anyone to living constitutionalism. I suppose one ei-
ther obsesses about the inter-generational problem of constitu-
tionalism and enables the anxiety to spill over to first-order con-
stitutional interpretation or one doesn't. In any case, I have 
probably provided at least as many reasons to reject living con-
stitutionalism as I have reasons to embrace it. It is hard, perhaps, 
to fault those who don't trust judges with life tenure or even the 
people themselves to undertake such a complicated interpretive 
project.47 
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) to the "radically unexpected." There is probably an impor-
tant difference between those who want to enforce the '"reasonable expectations" of the 
consumer and those who want to enforce all of the contract and any of its applications 
that aren't radically unexpected. Barnett gives us as much reason to embrace the former, 
however. as he does to embrace the latter. In any case. it is possible that the amendment 
provisions of the Constitution are unconscionable, see Ackerman, supra note 36, render-
ing non-Article V amendment perfectly constitutional after all. 
45. When Kozinski and Susman considered the analogy, they assumed that the 
drafter against whom the ambiguous provisions might need to be construed is the federal 
government. See Kozinski & Susman, supra note 32, at 1598-99. But we could just as eas-
ily imagine that ambiguities need to be construed against the authors and ratifiers of the 
original text who purported to bind future generations through a form contract. 
46. The Hollywood pitch is something like this: Corwin meets Corbin. 
47. About the issue of judicial restraint in particular, I think Balkin's remarks are 
innovative and interesting-and could be incorporated into accounts of living constitu-
tionalism. For Balkin. the constraints on judges come not from theories of constitutional 
interpretation but from what he calls '"institutional features of the political and legal sys-
tem." Balkin. supra note 1. at 309. If living constitutionalism needs an account of judicial 
restraint-and surely it does because the threat of illegitimacy from juristocracy is also 
substantial-Balkin offers a persuasive one. 
One might say that the living constitutionalist merely displaces the illegitimacy from 
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My modest project here has been to highlight Balkin's fail-
ure to address fully the needs and anxieties of a living constitu-
tionalism that is more than an anti-theoretical desire for flexibil-
ity and nice liberal results like the right to abortion. Indeed, I 
fear he trivializes living constitutionalism by suggesting that he 
accounts fully for its needs. By specifying some details about the 
interpretive mechanics of living constitutionalism and what may 
motivate those mechanics, I hope I have been able to suggest 
why originalism and living constitutionalism are not, as Balkin 
asserts, two sides of the same coin. Make no mistake: Balkin re-
jects living constitutionalism when he easily professes a faith in 
basic legitimacy. Living constitutionalism accepts fidelity as one 
modality of constitutional interpretation; but it doesn't have the 
faith that underwrites originalism, which preaches fidelity to the 
original meaning as the primary mode of interpretation. 
A real question remains for the limited project I have un-
dertaken here, however. Even if I am correct that Balkin em-
braces the interpretive mechanics of the originalists by dancing 
their two-step and prioritizing the historical in the derivation of 
principles, I still haven't shown that his resisting a full-scale con-
frontation with the question of the document's legitimacy in the 
"first step" makes any difference to constitutional outcomes. 
There may be some methodological and mechanical differences 
between his form of lefty originalism and the form of living con-
stitutionalism I describe here- but I have hardly shown that this 
is a distinction that makes a real difference.4l' I have, perhaps, 
shown that the two theories have somewhat different sensibili-
ties on a core question of interpretive methodology. But if they 
can get the same results, maybe Balkin's living constitutionalist 
friends won't feel abandoned, after all. 
I can't fully evaluate this prospect, mostly because neither 
Balkin's lefty originalism nor my reconstruction of living consti-
the document onto the judiciary. Perhaps. But the living constitutionalist can believe with 
Balkin that the judiciary is under much more substantial control by the living than the 
document itself-and the possibility of judicial restraint (even with eclectic interpretive 
mechanics) is very real. 
48. Anothe; thing I have not done here is argue for any right to abortion from the 
perspective of living constitutionalism. I have occupied myself here with much a more 
theoretical agenda (and. in the process. have made some controversial claims about the 
psychology of living constitutionalism). One of the great contributions of Balkin's work, 
however. is that he does much more than describe his "text and principles" approach as a 
matter of theory: he shows us how it works. Living constitutionalists are admittedly much 
better at theory than at careful specifications of how the motley method works in prac-
llce. At the very least. Balkin's flirtation with originalism should inspire real living consti-
tutionalists to do more to specify how their interpretive mechanics produce results. 
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tutionalism (and especially the latter) are sufficiently detailed to 
say with any certainty that they would regularly produce the 
same results. Yet, even supposing that the two accounts would 
routinely produce similar results, people surely choose their con-
stitutional theories for reasons other than the particular out-
comes they can produce on the questions of abortion, gay mar-
riage, and affirmative action. More, just because there may be 
some identity of results does not mean that we can avoid the task 
of choosing which method we prefer to get them. 
Finally, and most central to my themes here, living constitu-
tionalism is a mood and an anxiety at its core; its atmospherics 
are, I think, substantially different from Balkin's optimistic 
originalism. So even if Balkin's originalism and living constitu-
tionalism converge on certain outcomes, living constitutionalists 
might ultimately find Balkin's disposition too cheery and alienat-
ing to keep him around. The originalists have faith; living consti-
tutionalists are agnostics and require each generation to ask and 
answer the question of constitutional legitimacy in its own voice. 
